

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 031929

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SUBJECT: THE FOURTH CHINESE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

REF: STATE 30375

1. THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS IS FOR USE IN POLAD DISCUSSIONS ON THE FOURTH CHINESE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS.

2. OVERVIEW:

(A) THE PRC'S LONG-DELAYED FOURTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (NPC), HELD FROM 13-17 JANUARY, FORMALIZED STATE REFORMS RESULTING FROM THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. IT LAID OUT A MODERATE ECONOMIC COURSE, PLACED OLD-LINE BUREAUCRATS IN MOST TOP STATE POSITIONS, REAFFIRMED PARTY CONTROL OVER STATE AFFAIRS, AND FURTHER REDUCED MILITARY INFLUENCE OVER CIVIL AFFAIRS. THE NPC'S APPOINTMENT OF CHANG CHUN-CHAO AS A VICE PREMIER AND THE PROMOTION OF TENG HSIAO-PING TO PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN AT THE PRECEDING PARTY PLENUM (8-10 JANUARY) SEEM DESIGNED TO INSURE
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ORDERLY SUCCESSION TO CHOU EN-LAI AND MAO TSE-TUNG.

(B) WHILE MAO WAS NOT PRESENT AT EITHER THE NPC OR THE PARTY PLENUM, THE FACT THAT THE NPC WAS HELD SUGGESTS HE HAD NO MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE PROGRAMS ADOPTED. CERTAIN ELEMENTS MAY BE DISSATISFIED WITH THE CURRENT POWER BALANCE, INCLUDING CHIANG CHING AND SOME MILITARY LEADERS, BUT IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO UPSET THE BALANCE WITHOUT SUPPORT FROM MAO. ONE OF CHIANG CHING'S PROTEGES WAS MADE MINISTER OF CULTURE, BUT NONE OF THE OTHER APPOINTEES HAVE BEEN CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH HER.

(C) THE BRIEF NPC SESSION, LIKE THE 10TH PARTY CONGRESS IN AUGUST 1973, WAS HELD IN SECRET, WITH THE FIRST ANNOUNCEMENT ON 18 JANUARY, THE DAY AFTER THE SESSION CONCLUDED. ON THE FIRST DAY THE CONGRESS HEARD THE MAIN GOVERNMENT REPORT BY PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI AND A REPORT BY CHANG CHUN-CHIAO ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION, WHICH IS GENERALLY SIMILAR TO A 1970 DRAFT CONSTITUTION EXCEPT FOR DELETIONS OF FULSOME PRAISE OF MAO. THE CONSTITUTION ELIMINATES THE OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STATE, HANDING OVER MOST OF ITS PROTOCOL DUTIES TO THE NPC, AND IT PROVIDES FOR THE PARTY CHAIRMAN (NOW MAO) ASSUMING THE POST OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (PLA).

(D) CHOU EN-LAI'S REPORT TO THE NPC MADE PRO FORMA BOWS TO REVOLUTION, BUT FOCUSED ON A BLUEPRINT FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS WHICH LEAVES LITTLE LEEWAY FOR REVOLUTIONARY DISORDERS. CHOU HAILED THE VICTORY OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENT OF THE PAST 10 YEARS, REFERRED REPEATEDLY TO MAO'S ROLE IN FORMULATING POLICY, AND STATED THAT THE "PRIMARY TASK" IS TO DEEPEN THE ANTI-LIN PIAO AND CONFUCIUS MOVEMENT. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT SUGGEST A REVIVAL OF MASS MOVEMENTS, BUT RATHER STRESSED THAT IDEOLOGICAL STUDY AND CADRE LABOR WOULD BE THE PRIMARY TOOLS FOR INSURING PROLETARIAN RULE. CHOU SUPPLIED LITTLE DETAIL IN ENUMERATING PRC ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS, BUT HE DID CLAIM THAT THE CURRENT FIVE-YEAR PLAN WOULD BE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED THIS YEAR. CHOU

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STATED THAT FUTURE ECONOMIC PLANNING WOULD PROCEED ON LINES ORDERED BY MAO PRIOR TO THE THIRD NPC 10 YEARS AGO: THE ECONOMY WOULD BE DEVELOPED IN TWO STAGES WITH THE FIRST STAGE DUE FOR COMPLETION IN 1980, AND THE SECOND STAGE--PUTTING CHINA AMONG THE FRONT RANKS OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES--WOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF THE CENTURY.

(E) IN HIS REMARKS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CHOU PORTRAYED A FAVORABLE WORLD SITUATION IN WHICH THE SUPERPOWERS ARE DECLINING WHILE THE POWER OF THE THIRD WORLD IS INCREASING. CHOU ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE UNITED STATES, ALONG WITH CHINA, HAD WORKED TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS AND HE FORESAW FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE WERE CARRIED OUT IN EARNEST. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE WAS NOTABLY HARSH IN REMARKS ON THE SOVIET UNION. WHILE CHOU AS USUAL CALLED FOR MAINTENANCE OF NORMAL STATE RELATIONS, HE VOICED THE FIRST AUTHORITATIVE CHINESE PUBLIC PROTEST OVER LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER TALKS, AND IN FACT CHARACTERIZED SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AS AT A STANDSTILL.

(F) A CHART LISTING THE OFFICIALS APPOINTED AS VICE PREMIERS OF THE STATE COUNCIL OR AS MINISTERS APPEARS IN AN APPENDIX FOLLOWING THE TEXT OF THIS REPORT. THE CHART LISTS NEW POSITIONS FILLED BY THE NPC, ALONG WITH OTHER MAJOR OFFICES HELD BY THE APPOINTEES, THEIR PREVIOUS STATE OFFICES, AND THEIR STATUS DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. END OVERVIEW

3. REAFFIRMATION OF PARTY CONTROL OVER STATE:

(A) THE LONG-AWAITED FOURTH NPC FORMALLY REAFFIRMED PARTY CONTROL OVER THE STATE, GENERALLY PLACED THE STATE APPARATUS IN THE HANDS OF EXPERIENCED BUREAUCRATS, AND INDICATED THAT TENG HSIAO-PING AND CHANG CHUN-CHIAO WILL BE IN CHARGE OF DAY-TO-DAY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS. PARTY CONTROL OVER THE GOVERNMENT WAS ASSURED BY NAMING EIGHT ACTIVE POLITBURO MEMBERS AND ALTERNATES A; VICE PREMIERS. PARTY CONTROL OVER THE ARMY WAS FORMALIZED BY A CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE MAKING THE CCP CHAIRMAN COMMANDER CONFIDENTIAL

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IN CHIEF OF THE PLA.

(B) THE FOURTH NPC WAS A SMALLER, MUCH BRIEFER SESSION THAN THE THIRD NPC. SOME 2,884 DEPUTIES ATTENDED THE RECENT CONGRESS COMPARED WITH THE 3,040 DEPUTIES WHO GATHERED IN PEKING FOR TWO WEEKS IN DECEMBER 1964-JANUARY 1965. WHEREAS NO REPORT WAS ISSUED ON THE FOURTH NPC UNTIL IT HAD CONCLUDED, THE THIRD NPC WAS A RELATIVELY OPEN AFFAIR WITH DAILY NCNA REPORTS WRAPPING UP THE FOURTH NPC, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION INJUNCTION TO SIMPLIFY ADMINISTRATION, APPROVED REDUCTION OF THE NUMBER OF MINISTERS ON THE STATE COUNCIL

FROM 40 TO 29. THE SESSION MADE ONLY A TOKEN BOW TO YOUTHFUL ACTIVISTS, THOUGH THE NEW CONSTITUTION REITERATES

THE PRINCIPLE OF LEADERSHIP BY "THE OLD, THE MIDDLE-AGED, AND THE YOUNG."

(C) TENG, CHANG IN LEADING ROLES: THE SELECTION OF TENG HSIAO-PING AND CHANG CHUN-CHIAO AS PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN AND VICE PREMIER, RESPECTIVELY, SEEMS AIMED AT INSURING AN ORDERLY SUCCESSION. THE TWO LEADERS STOOD ON OPPOSITE SIDES DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, BUT THEY BRING SIMILAR EXPERIENCES IN THE PARTY BUREAUCRACY TO THEIR STATE ROLES. TENG WAS CCP SECRETARY-GENERAL UNTIL HIS PURGE IN 1966. THERE WAS EXTENSIVE DENUNCIATION OF HIM IN THE RED GUARD PRESS, BUT NOT IN THE OFFICIAL MEDIA. HIS RISE TO TOP LEADERSHIP AGAIN HAS BEEN A RAPID ONE, SINCE HE WAS ONLY REHABILITATED AS A VICE PREMIER IN 1973. HE WAS NAMED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AT THE 10TH PARTY CONGRESS IN AUGUST 1973; APPARENTLY WAS COOPTED ONTO THE POLITBURO AT THE END OF THAT YEAR; ACTED, ALONG WITH LI HSIEN-NIEN, IN SUBSTITUTING FOR PREMIER CHOU LAST YEAR; AND WAS NAMED A PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN AT THE SECOND PARTY PLENUM HELD PRIOR TO THE NPC.

(D) CHANG HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN CENTRAL PARTY AFFAIRS SINCE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND WAS SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE 10TH PARTY CONGRESS. ALTHOUGH NEVER PUBLICLY NAMED AS SECRETARY-GENERAL, HIS DELIVERY OF THE REPORT ON THE CONSTITUTION TO THE NPC ON BEHALF OF THE PARTY SUGGESTS CONFIDENTIAL

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THAT HE HAS CONTINUED TO ACT IN THAT ROLE. CHANG WAS A PARTY SECRETARY IN SHANGHAI AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, HAVING RISEN TO THE POST THROUGH THE MUNICIPAL LITERARY BUREAUCRACY IN THE YEARS SINCE 1949. WITH YAO WEN-YUAN, HE SUPPORTED CHIANG CHING'S CULTURAL REFORMS AND HELPED LAUNCH THE STRUGGLE THAT PRODUCED THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, BECOMING A DEPUTY HEAD OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP IN 1966. AFTER THE "JANUARY REVOLUTION" IN SHANGHAI IN 1967, HE WAS ENTRUSTED WITH RUNNING THE CITY BY THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES. HE WAS NAMED TO THE POLITBURO AT THE NINTH PARTY CONGRESS IN 1969 AND TO ITS STANDING COMMITTEE AT THE 10TH PARTY CONGRESS. SINCE 1970, HE HAS SPENT MOST OF THE CULTURAL FIELD IN WHICH HE FIRST ACHIEVED PROMINENCE. JUDGING BY THE ECONOMIC POLICIES ESPOUSED BY SHANGHAI MEDIA DURING HIS TENURE THERE, CHANG IS AN ECONOMIC MODERATE WHO BELIEVES IN CENTRAL PLANNING AND CENTRAL ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.

(E) THE PARTY AND STATE POWER WIELDED BY TENG AND CHANG CLEARLY OVERSHADOWS THAT HELD BY ANY OTHER LEADERS UNDER MAO AND CHOU EXCEPT FOR VICE CHAIRMAN YEH CHIEN-

YING, A LONGTIME CHOU ALLY WHO, AS A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER, IS NOT THOUGHT TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR THE TOP PARTY OR STATE POSTS. YEH WAS NAMED DEFENSE MINISTER BY THE NPC BUT WAS NOT MADE A VICE PREMIER, PRESUMABLY TO INDICATE THE LIMITS OF HIS STATE CONTROL.

(F) ACCORDING TO WESTERN PRESS REPORTS, QUOTING OFFICIALS IN THE PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY, TENG HAS ALSO BEEN MADE CHIEF OF THE PLA GENERAL STAFF AND CHANG HEAD OF THE PLA GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT. (IF USUAL CHINESE PRACTICE IS FOLLOWED, NEITHER APPOINTMENT WILL BE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED. RATHER, NCNA IS LIKELY TO MENTION THE NEW MILITARY IDENTIFICATIONS WHEN THESE OFFICIALS ATTEND SOME PUBLIC FUNCTION IN THEIR MILITARY CAPACITY.) THESE APPOINTMENTS FURTHER INDICATE THE IMPORTANCE ASSIGNED BY CHINA'S CIVILIAN LEADERS TO THE TASK OF BRINGING THE ARMY FIRMLY UNDER CIVILIAN PARTY CONTROL. IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT EITHER TENG OR CHANG WILL DEVOTE MUCH TIME TO PLA RESPONSIBILITIES. FORMER ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF YANG
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CHENG-WU, REHABILITATED JUST LAST YEAR, SEEMS LIKELY TO ASSUME DAY-TO-DAY CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY STRUCTURE. TENG WAS LONG ACTIVE IN THE PLA BUT AS A POLITICAL COMMISSAR, NOT A COMMANDER. CHANG HELD PURELY CIVILIAN POSTS IN SHANGHAI UNTIL HE WAS NAMED POLITICAL COMMISSAR OF THE NANKING MILITARY REGION SUBSEQUENT TO BECOMING SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL CHIEF IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

4. CHOU EN-LAI ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS:

(A) CHOU EN-LAI'S REPORT TO THE NPC REFLECTED AN EVOLUTION OF THE VIEWS HE HAD PRESENTED IN HIS REPORT AT THE 10TH PARTY CONGRESS IN AUGUST 1973--HIS LAST COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HIS MUCH SHORTER NPC REPORT WAS PARTICULARLY NOTABLE FOR ITS IMAGE OF A WORLD SITUATION MARKEDLY FAVORABLE TO CHINA. CHOU DID GIVE MORE CREDENCE TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT CONTENTION BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS COULD LEAD TO WORLD WAR, BUT HIS REMARKS WERE COUCHED IN A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND DID NOT PICTURE CHINA AS THREATENED. HE ASSESSED SINO-U.S. RELATIONS IN POSITIVE TERMS, BUT HE BLUNTLY CHARACTERIZED SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AS AT A STANDSTILL.

(B) WORLD VIEW: CHOU DEPARTED SOMEWHAT FROM THE PRC LINE ON WORLD WAR AND REVOLUTION THAT HAS BEEN STANDARD FOR ALMOST FIVE YEARS. HE SAID THAT THE "FIERCE CONTENTION" BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION "IS BOUND TO LEAD TO WORLD WAR SOME DAY," AND HE WAS EQUIVOCAL AS TO WHETHER WAR OR REVOLUTION WAS MORE LIKELY, SAYING THAT

"THE FACTORS FOR BOTH REVOLUTION AND WAR ARE INCREASING."
BY CONTRAST, CHOU AT THE 10TH PARTY CONGRESS HAD QUOTED
THE PASSAGE IN MAO TSE-TUNG'S 20 MAY 1970 STATEMENT THAT
WHILE "THE DANGER OF NEW WORLD WAR STILL EXISTS," REVOLU-
TION AGAINST IMPERIALISM IS THE "MAIN TREND" IN THE WORLD
TODAY. THE MAO FORMULATION HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY QUOTED IN
AUTHORITATIVE CHINESE COMMENT UP TO THE PRESENT. REFLECT-
ING HIS BALANCED VIEW OF WAR AND REVOLUTION, CHOU APPEARED
SANGUINE ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF THE THIRD WORLD, AND HE
DECLARED THAT "WHETHER WAR GIVES RISE TO REVOLUTION OR
REVOLUTION PREVENTS WAR, IN EITHER CASE THE INTERNATIONAL
SITUATION WILL DEVELOP IN A DIRECTION FAVORABLE TO THE
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PEOPLE" THIS ASSERTION IS SIMILAR TO LIN PIAO'S
REMARK AT THE 9TH CCP CONGRESS IN APRIL 1969 WHEN HE CITED
A MAO QUOTATION TO THE EFFECT THAT EITHER WORLD WAR WILL
GIVE RISE TO REVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION WILL PREVENT WAR.

(C) CHOU'S REMARK ON THE INEVITABILITY AT SOME FUTURE
TIME OF A MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER-
POWERS SEEMED AIMED PRIMARILY AT DISPARAGING THE NOTION OF
A POSSIBLE RELAXATION OF U.S.-SOVIET TENSIONS UNDER THE
COVER OF DETENTE. REFERRING TO RECENT TALK OF DETENTE AND
PEACE AROUND THE WORLD, CHOU MAINTAINED THAT ALL THE TALK
MERELY PROVES "THERE IS NO DETENTE, LET ALONE LASTING
PEACE, IN THIS WORLD." ASSESSING WHAT HE SAW AS PROGRES-
SIVELY INCREASING U.S.-SOVIET CONTENTION FOR WORLD CONTROL,
CHOU INDICATED THAT THE PRESENT "ECONOMIC CRISIS" IN THE
"CAPITALIST WORLD" HAS SERVED TO INTENSIFY U.S.-SOVIET

COMPETITION, AND HE REPEATED HIS JUDGMENT AT THE 10TH
PARTY CONGRESS THAT EUROPE IS THE PRESENT FOCUS OF U.S.-
SOVIET RIVALRY.

(D) CHOU WAS NOTABLY MORE SANGUINE ABOUT CHINA'S OWN
NATIONAL SECURITY THAN HE HAD BEEN IN 1973. HE REPEATED
HIS 1973 SLOGAN PLAYING DOWN THE SOVIET THREAT TO CHINA IN
NOTING THAT MOSCOW MERELY "MAKES A FEINT TO THE EAST WHILE
ATTACKING IN THE WEST," AND HE DROPPED HIS 1973 ADDITIONAL
ALLEGATION THAT THE WEST HAS ALWAYS SOUGHT TO DIVERT THE
SOVIET THREAT EASTWARD, TOWARD CHINA. CHOU ALSO DROPPED HIS
1973 ADMONITION AGAINST THE POSSIBLE LAUNCHING OF AN
IMPERIALIST WAR AGAINST CHINA AND HIS SPECIAL WARNING
AGAINST "SURPRISE ATTACK" FROM THE USSR. HIS ROUTINE
INSTRUCTIONS ON NATIONAL DEFENSE INCLUDED CALLS FOR THE
PEOPLE TO MAINTAIN "VIGILANCE" AND BE "PREPARED" AGAINST
WAR. (IN 1973 CHOU ENJOINED THE PEOPLE TO MAINTAIN "HIGH
VIGILANCE" AND TO BE "FULLY PREPARED" AGAINST WAR.)

(E) CHOU VOICED CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR PEKING'S FLEXIBLE FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH UNDER THE BANNER OF MAO'S "REVOLUTIONARY LINE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS," AND HE GAVE HEIGHTENED ATTENTION TO IMPROVING TIES WITH THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE SO-CALLED SECOND WORLD. THUS, HE OFFERED PEKING'S CONFIDENTIAL

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HIGHEST LEVEL ENDORSEMENT FOR WEST EUROPEAN UNITY AGAINST SUPERPOWER THREATS AND BULLYING, AND VOICED CHINESE READINESS TO PROMOTE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH JAPAN ON THE BASIS OF THE 1972 SINO-JAPANESE STATEMENTS. CHOU REAFFIRMED CHINA'S INTENTION NEVER TO BE A SUPERPOWER, ITS SOLIDARITY WITH THE THIRD WORLD, AND ITS INTENTION TO UPHOLD PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM. HE ALSO PROMISED TO ENHANCE TIES WITH "SOCIALIST COUNTRIES."

(F) SINO-U.S. RELATIONS: CHOU ECHOED HIS ASSESSMENT AT THE 10TH PARTY CONGRESS THAT SINO-U.S. RELATIONS "HAVE IMPROVED TO SOME EXTENT" OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS. HOWEVER, HE ADDED A PHRASE GIVING CREDIT TO THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS TO THE PRC, STATING THAT IMPROVEMENT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED THROUGH "JOINT EFFORTS OF BOTH SIDES." THOUGH CHOU NOTED THAT "THERE EXIST FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES," HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO IMPROVE SO LONG AS THE TWO COUNTRIES CARRY OUT "IN EARNEST" THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE.

(G) CHOU DID NOT REPEAT HIS 1973 REFERENCES TO U.S. DEFEATS" IN KOREA AND VIETNAM AND TO THE "DECLINE" OF U.S. POWER OVER THE PAST GENERATION. AND, ALTHOUGH HE CONTINUED TO LIST THE UNITED STATES AHEAD OF THE SOVIET

UNION IN COMMENTING ON THE SUPERPOWERS, HE DROPPED ALL REFERENCE TO "U.S. IMPERIALISM," WHICH HAD BEEN CITED FREQUENTLY IN HIS 1973 REPORT. BY CONTRAST, HE CONTINUED TO REFER TO "SOVIET SOCIAL-IMPERIALISM." THE PREMIER GAVE ONLY ROUTINE ATTENTION TO TAIWAN, REAFFIRMING DETERMINATION TO "LIBERATE" THE ISLAND WHILE CALLING ON "FELLOW COUNTRYMEN" ON TAIWAN TO JOIN IN THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE.

(H) SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: THOUGH HIS DISCUSSION OF THE USSR WAS SHORTER AND LESS POLEMICAL THAN HIS ANTI-SOVIET DIATRIBE AT THE 1973 PARTY CONGRESS, CHOU CHARACTERIZED SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AS AT A STANDSTILL, OPENLY ATTACKED SOVIET "DECEPTION" ON THE BORDER ISSUE, AND CHALLENGED MOSCOW TO MEET CHINESE DEMANDS CONCERNING THE FRONTIER. CHOU ACCUSED THE "SOVIET LEADING CLIQUE" OF HAVING CONFIDENTIAL

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BETRAYED MARXISM-LENINISM AND OF HAVING TAKEN A SERIES OF ACTIONS--INCLUDING SUBVERSION AND PROVOKING OF ARMED CLASHES ALONG THE FRONTIER--TO WORSEN STATE RELATIONS WITH CHINA. CHOU REPEATED CHARGES CONCERNING THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER AND THE PEKING BORDER TALKS WHICH WERE CONTAINED IN THE CHINESE MESSAGE TO THE USSR ON THE 6 NOVEMBER 1974, OCTOBER REVOLUTION ANNIVERSARY AND IN AN ARTICLE IN THE DECEMBER ISSUE OF THE CHINESE JOURNAL HISTORICAL STUDIES. THIS REPRESENTS CHOU'S FIRST PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER TALKS, AS WELL AS PEKING'S FIRST AUTHORITATIVE COMMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, SINCE THEY BEGAN IN OCTOBER 1969.

(I) CHOU CLAIMED THAT MOSCOW IS TOTALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LACK OF PROGRESS BECAUSE IT HAS REFUSED TO ADHERE TO THE PRC-USSR UNDERSTANDING REACHED DURING THE SEPTEMBER 1969 PEKING MEETING BETWEEN CHOU AND KOSYGIN THAT LED TO THE START OF THE FORMAL BORDER TALKS. HE SAID THAT THE UNDERSTANDING INCLUDED AN ACCORD ON MUTUAL NON-AGGRESSION AND NON-USE OF FORCE, AS WELL AS AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW FORCES FROM DISPUTED BORDER AREAS. CHOU SAID THAT MOSCOW HAS REFUSED TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT WITHDRAWING FROM DISPUTED AREAS, AND HAS EVEN DENIED THE EXISTENCE OF DISPUTED BORDER AREAS. HE ACCUSED THE RUSSIANS OF TALKING PROFUSELY ABOUT "EMPTY TREATIES" ON NON-USE OF FORCE AND NON-AGGRESSION IN ORDER TO DECEIVE SOVIET AND WORLD OPINION, AND ADVISED MOSCOW TO STOP ITS "DECEITFUL TRICKS," NEGOTIATE HONESTLY AND "DO SOMETHING" TO SOLVE "A BIT" OF THE BORDER PROBLEM.

(J) CHOU'S STATEMENT SEEMS TO SERVE NOTICE ON THE SOVIET UNION THAT IT MUST MAKE THE NEXT MOVE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. HIS REMARKS, TOGETHER WITH OTHER RECENT CHINESE CHARGES OVER THE BORDER TALKS, RECALL SIMILAR PRC COMMENT TWO

DECADES AGO DURING THE YEAR PRIOR TO SUSPENSION OF THE SINO-U.S. AMBASSADORIAL TALKS AT GENEVA IN THE MID-50'S. IN LATE 1956 PEKING MEDIA BEGAN SHOWING SERIOUS AGITATION OVER WHAT IT TERMED U.S. INTRANSIGENCE IN THE TALKS, AND ON 10 DECEMBER 1956 CHOU JOINED THE FRAY. HE COMPLAINED THAT VARIOUS CHINESE INITIATIVES "HAD RECEIVED NO COR-

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RESPONDING RESPONSE" FROM THE UNITED STATES AND ADDED THAT "IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WANTS TO SATISFY THE DESIRE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR FRIENDSHIP WITH THE PEOPLES OF

THE WORLD, INCLUDING THE CHINESE PEOPLE, THEY SHOULD "DO SOMETHING" TO IMPROVE SINO-U.S. RELATIONS." PEKING'S RIGID STANCE LED TO A COMPLETE STALEMATE IN THE TALKS AND PROMPTED THE UNITED STATES TO SUSPEND THE AMBASSADORIAL NEGOTIATIONS IN DECEMBER 1957 BY WITHDRAWING ITS REPRESENTATIVE AND FAILING TO NAME A REPLACEMENT. INGERSOLL

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